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XI.—NOTES. '
The Uniformity of Nature.—Professor Bain maintains that we can
give no reason for our belief that the fntare must resemble the
past; but that the postulate of the uniformity of Causation is an
assumption. We must risk it, we cannot logically justify it.
Although, as a matter of fact, we believe that water will boil at
212° ¥., " there is no contradiction in saying that a million of years
hence the boiling point at the ordinary pressure of the air will be
raised to 250° F. (Man), No. L, p. 146.) I have maintained that
the true expression of the uniformity of Causation (usually called
Nature's uniformity) is the simple assertion of identity of effect
under identical conditions ; whatever is, is and will be so long as its
conditions are unchanged; and this, I- say, is no assumption at all,
but an identical proposition. (Problems of Life and Mind, vol. II.,
p. 99.)
The psychological grounds on which we believe in uniformity are
.not quite the same as the logical grounds on which we may justify
that belief. The belief proceeds on an assumption, but what is
assumed is the identity of past and future: we believe that the water
will boil at the same temperature to-morrow as to-day, and a million
of years hence as to-morrow, only when we have no ground for sus-
pecting any change will take place in the conditions which determine
the boiling of water; knowing quite well that if there is a chango in
the conditions there must be a corresponding change in the result.
When this belief has to be logically justified it can only bo by
reducing its terms to the terms of the identical proposition—" there
will be no change unless there is a change." The combinations of
Nature are incessantly varying, the uniformity of Nature is the
identity of result under identical conditions. It is not more
irrational to Ruppose the boiling point of water to be raised to
250° F. under certain changes in atmospheric pressure, than to
suppose it lowered to 100° under other changes; but to suppose
that, while the conditions represented by the 212° boiling ^oint
remain unchanged, there will be any change in tho result, is to
suppose (as John Mill supposed) that 2 + 2 might possibly equal 5
in another universe.
Professor Bain rejects my view, unless I am understood to include
Time and Space among the conditions ; in that case he will admit
it. " I s he prepared," he asks, " to set aside time and space as not
being conditions, as not needing to be taken account of at all ? "
I answer: Time and Space are abstractions; drawn, indeed,
from concrete experiences, but not operative as abstractions among
physical agencies. Ho declares that, " although the physical con-
ditions of an effect remain as they are, the effect may not be constant
through all tho eternity of years, and nil the infinitude of space."
Does this mean that an effect depends partly on its physical and
partly on metaphysical conditions : or that an effect is the product












movements of the planetary system symbolised in the phrase, " the
eternity of years," may conceivably bring about snch changes in
the molecular movements of bodies, that effects now observed under
the present conditions of movement will no longer be observable ;
but this only on the supposition of a corresponding change in the
conditions; and for this supposition we do not need to invoke
eternity, or the abstraction Tune : we see eueh interruptions of the
uniformity of Nature under the present variableness of conditions.
I have ventured to re-open this question because the objection,
that I do not take into account the possibility that Time may be a
condition in causation, has been urged by Professor Clifford,
Mr. Pollock, and Professor Bain; and urged by such writers it
ought not to be left unanswered. Perhaps I do not rightly seize
their meaning; at any rate the readers of MIND have here a topic
on which to exercise their ingenuity; and some one of them may
see how the question admits of settlement.
GKOEOE HENRY LEWBB.
Space through Sight and Touch.—Our habitual thoughts of space
are all associated with sight, yet since the time of Berkeley it has
been the general belief that the conception of space has been
originally derived altogether from touch. I think this is not only
true, but as nearly a demonstrated truth as the nature of the case
admits of, and the proof that I think conclusive is as follows :—
A being with no sense except sight, and no power of locomotion,
might acquire a conception of space, but it would be very unlike
space as we conceive it. It would be space of two dimensions
only, there would be nothing to indicate distance between the eye
and any object: all things would be seen projected on a sphere as
we see the heavens, and all. magnitudes would appear angular. If
then such a being afterwards acquired powers of touch and motion,
it would acquire the conceptions of a third dimension in space and
of linear extension; but angular magnitudo would always continue
more familiar to its thoughts than linear, and it would think of
extension, both superficial and solid, in terms of polar rather than
rectilineal co-ordinates.
On the contrary, a being with the sense of touch and the power
of motion, but without the sense of sight, would learn to think of
Hpace in terms of rectilineal rather than polar co-ordinates ; and if
it were afterwards to acquire the sense of sight it would still retain
the same habit of thought.
We may infer the latter to be our case : we spontaneously think of
space in terms of rectilineal co-ordinates. No one has any clear idea of
the meaning of angular magnitude until he has received his first lesson
in geometry; and to any one whose ideas on the subject are purely
spontaneous, it will appear not a simple geometrical truth, but an
utter absurdity, that neither a straight lino nor a plane surface can
become an object of sight. (See Reid's Geometry of Visibles.)
Moreover, common language abounds in words expressive of the
relations of space in terms of rectilinear co-ordinates : such words
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